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We use a simple model of collaborative innovation to structure an empirical analysis of minority 
equity links in biotechnology alliances between clients and R&D firms. In the model, an equity 
link is an investment in information acquisition: it improves the ability of the client to learn 
about the R&D firm’s ability and the alliance project’s quality. The model generates several 
testable hypotheses about how the R&D firm’s project characteristics and previous alliances 
affect the use of equity links in new alliances. We test the hypotheses using a large data set of 
biotechnology alliances and find empirical support. 
 
JEL Codes: L14: Contracts and Reputation; L22: Markets vs. Hierarchies; O32: Management 
of R&D 
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1. Introduction 
 
Most of the literature on the theory of the firm examines whether a transaction should take place 
within the firm or the market, but hybrid arrangements in between these two extremes are 
increasingly common, particularly in high-technology industries. Successful innovation requires 
several ingredients: facilities, funds, human capital, incentives, and technology, among others. 
Firms that want to innovate often lack one or more of these ingredients. For example, small R&D 
firms often have know-how and incentives but lack other ingredients, and while large “client” 
firms have the other ingredients, they lack the required know-how and cannot replicate the 
incentive structure of the R&D firms. Strategic alliances are a way for two or more firms to 
combine ingredients without bearing the costs associated with merging or setting up a joint 
venture. Alliances have proved to be a popular way of organizing R&D, and interest in studying 
them has grown in recent years.
1 
Partners in an alliance use a variety of contractual devices to organize exchange including 
asset purchases, cross-licenses, equity links, licenses, loans, options, sublicenses, and termination 
clauses. Given the growing popularity of alliances as an organizational form, it is increasingly 
important to understand when the different contractual devices are used. This paper provides a 
step in this direction by focusing on whether alliance partners use a minority equity link. A 
minority equity link is formed when the client buys less than 50% of the R&D firm’s equity.
2 
The allies remain distinct entities. In contrast, joint ventures involve the creation of a separate 
entity jointly owned by the partners, and mergers and acquisitions involve full integration. The 
focus on minority equity links is useful because alliances with equity links can be thought of as 
one step further towards hierarchy on the market vs. hierarchy axis (Williamson, 1985; Teece, 
1992). 
The goal of this paper is to develop and test a simple model that predicts when minority 
equity links are used in strategic alliances. The model has a client, an R&D firm, and a project. 
The basic framework is similar to Aghion and Tirole (1994) and Filson (2000): the R&D firm 
                                                        
1 Contributors include Pisano et al. (1988), Pisano (1989), Arora and Gambardella (1990), Teece (1992), Gulati 
(1995a, 1995b), Prevezer and Toker (1996), Chan et al. (1997), Oxley (1997), Walker et al. (1997), Gulati and Singh 
(1998), and Lerner and Merges (1998). 
2 A link could also be formed if the R&D firm buys equity in the client or if the firms exchange shares, but it is 
much more common for the client to buy some of the R&D firm’s equity, so this is what we focus on in our model. 
In a biotechnology alliance the R&D firm is typically a small startup and the client firm is a large drug company.   4
lacks some required ingredients that the client must provide and the exact nature of the product 
that will be generated is difficult to predict in advance. The R&D firm’s ability and the project’s 
quality are not known with certainty, and staged investments are possible. Equity links facilitate 
monitoring, which allows the client to learn about the R&D firm and the project. Equity links 
play this role in reality by creating closer ties between the allies, which facilitates information 
flows. Significant equity stakes are typically accompanied by representation on the R&D firm’s 
board of directors, which further facilitates information acquisition. 
The model generates several falsifiable hypotheses about when equity links are used in 
strategic alliances. Under the assumption that the client’s belief about the R&D firm’s ability is 
positively correlated with the R&D firm’s success in related projects, an equity link is less likely 
to be used when the R&D firm has more previous successful alliances. This effect is stronger if 
more of the previous alliances use similar technology to the current one, and if more of the 
previous alliances are with the current ally.
3 An equity link is more likely to be used when: 1) the 
project’s outcome is more difficult to predict, as is the case in R&D alliances or technology 
exchanges; 2) the client’s investment in the project is greater, as is the case when more funds 
must be transferred, and in co-development, co-marketing, and other types of collaborative 
alliances; 3) the R&D firm’s value is low, because it is cheaper to acquire a significant stake in 
the firm; 4) the R&D firm is publicly traded, because the transaction cost of acquiring equity is 
lower. Finally, a brief consideration of a dynamic extension of the model that allows for gradual 
information acquisition suggests that an equity link is more likely to be used when the contract is 
modified after the initial signing date and when the contract is signed during a stage of the 
project that involves a high risk of failure, high investment, or both. 
We test the model using a large data set on biotechnology alliances formed from the mid 
1970s until May 2001 and find support for the model’s hypotheses. The biotechnology industry 
is an excellent example of an industry where alliances have been important for innovation, and 
the industry is of interest in itself because of continuing growth and scientific advances.
4 Since 
the mid-1970s strong links between scientific advances and marketable products have made it 
difficult for established firms to keep up with technological progress in biotechnology. As a 
                                                        
3 Gulati (1998) argues for considering the firm’s existing network of alliances when analyzing alliances; our work 
provides a step in this direction.   5
result, several new biotechnology firms have emerged. These firms lack many of the required 
ingredients for innovation, and most have multiple alliances with drug firms and other 
biotechnology firms. Figure 1 graphs the number of biotechnology alliances formed each year 
since 1975. Early alliances were drug/biotech alliances, in which small new biotechnology 
companies provided know-how and R&D effort, and large established drug companies provided 
other resources. Some of the small biotechnology companies grew, and since the mid-1980s 
biotech/biotech alliances have become common. In many of these alliances one of the 
biotechnology companies takes on the drug company’s role; others have a more horizontal 
nature. 
Previous studies of equity links in biotechnology alliances and other alliances include 
Pisano, 1989; Gulati, 1995a; Prevezer and Toker, 1996; Oxley, 1997; and Gulati and Singh, 
1998. Our paper contributes to this literature in several ways: First, we use a formal model to 
structure the empirical analysis. The model forces us to be clear about what assumptions lead to 
our hypotheses and forces us to be clear about what the driving forces for equity links are. 
Second, the model leads us to consider some variables that have not been considered in previous 
analyses, such as the R&D firm’s number of previous alliances, the R&D firm’s number of 
previous alliances that use the same technology, the estimated dollar amount that will be 
transferred from the client to the R&D firm, the value of the R&D firm, whether the R&D firm is 
publicly traded, whether the alliance terms were modified after the initial date, and the stage of 
the project. Third, we attempt to gather as many biotechnology alliances as possible from the 
1970s until June, 2001. Previous studies typically rely on small samples from the universe of 
possible alliances and concentrate on alliances formed in the 1970s and 1980s. This is 
particularly problematic in the biotechnology industry, because as Figure 1 shows the number of 
alliances has risen dramatically over time. 
 
2. The Model 
 
The model has a client C, an R&D firm R, and a project. The formal analysis focuses on a single 
decision: C either acquires a minority equity stake in R at the beginning of the project or does 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
4 As Pisano et al. (1988) note, the biotechnology industry includes a variety of different technologies, and there are 
many potential applications including agriculture, chemicals, drugs, and industrial processes. Lists of the 
technologies and applications in our data are provided in Appendix A.   6
not.
5 In the model this is C’s decision alone – we implicitly assume that C has enough bargaining 
power to make this choice. This is a reasonable assumption in the biotechnology industry 
because clients are typically much larger and more established than R&D firms (for a discussion 
of bargaining power and biotechnology alliances see Lerner and Merges, 1998). In any case, we 
believe that this structure is sufficient to describe the main factors that affect whether equity 
links are used in biotechnology alliances. 
Neither player can complete the project by itself; C lacks know-how and R lacks 
resources. C must invest I in the project, and if the project is successfully completed C receives 
the expected payoff V; otherwise C receives nothing. We do not consider the bargaining process 
that determines V, but we assume that the level of V is unaffected by the existence of an equity 
link.
6 Given this, we show below that V does not affect C’s decision to purchase equity. Assume 
that V is sufficiently high to make C’s participation in the alliance worthwhile. 
Two sources of uncertainty affect the likelihood of project success: R is either good or 
bad and the project is either good or bad. Assume that both R and the project must be good in 
order for the project to succeed from C’s point of view, but that C cannot observe these types 
before investing some funds.
7 Denote C’s prior belief that R is good by p and C’s prior belief that 
the project is good by q, where both of these probabilities are greater than zero. Given these 
beliefs, C’s expected utility from investing in the project without any further information is 
. I pqV U c − =          ( 1 )  
Now suppose that before investing I, C can acquire a minority equity link in R at a cost of 
t e+ , where e is an investment and t is the transaction cost associated with the equity purchase. 
The equity purchase accomplishes two objectives. First, the transfer of e allows the project to 
begin. Second, the equity link facilitates monitoring. The role of monitoring is to resolve C’s 
uncertainty about R and the project before  e I −  must be spent. We make two extreme 
                                                        
5 We do not consider the decision to fully integrate because the previous literature provides several arguments for 
why full integration is usually not optimal in innovative environments. Holmstrom (1989) and Aghion and Tirole 
(1994) argue that integration reduces the R&D firm’s incentives. Williamson (1985) argues that the impossibility of 
selective intervention discourages full integration. More recently, Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (forthcoming, 2001) 
argue that full integration may be undesirable because it affects the ability of parties to manage relational contracts. 
Rather than repeat their arguments, we simply assume that the relevant choice is between an alliance with an equity 
link and one without one. 
6 Aghion and Tirole (1994) present formal arguments that show that the presence of an equity link need not affect V 
because ex post bargaining over payments takes the link into account. We simply assume this here.   7
assumptions that simplify computations without any loss in the resulting intuition. First, assume 
that monitoring is impossible without an equity link.
8 Second, assume monitoring resolves 
uncertainty completely – this implies that C invests  e I −  only if it observes that both R and the 
project are good. Given these assumptions, if C purchases an equity link then C’s expected utility 
is 
 . )] ( [ t e e I V pq U c − − − − =          ( 2 )  
It is now straightforward to compare equations (1) and (2) to see that purchasing the 
equity link is worthwhile if and only if 
 . ) 1 )( ( t pq e I ≥ − −           ( 3 )  
Inequality (3) is a standard result from the economics of decision making under uncertainty. The 
equity link is essentially an investment in information acquisition, and in order for this 
investment to be worthwhile the expected saving  ) 1 )( ( pq e I − −  must exceed the expected cost t. 
Simple partial derivatives show that inequality (3) is more likely to hold when I is high and p, q, 
e and t are low. In the following paragraphs, we use this result to generate testable hypotheses 
about factors that affect C’s decision to acquire an equity link. 
  First, consider factors that affect p, C’s prior belief about R’s type. It is reasonable to 
assume that C’s belief about R’s ability in the current project is positively correlated with R’s 
success in its previous projects. Given this assumption, p is likely to be higher if R has more 
previous successful alliances. Further, p is likely to increase more if R’s previous alliances used 
the same technology as the current one because the information C obtains from observing these 
is more pertinent. C can also base its decision on its own experience with R. If C has previous 
alliances with R in which R did not perform well then C could avoid selecting R for a current 
partner. Thus, if C and R have more previous alliances together and form a new alliance together 
it is a sign that C believes R is good. When combined with inequality (3), these conclusions 
suggest the following testable hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: An equity link is less likely to be used when R has more previous alliances. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
7 “Good” and “bad” could depend on a variety of factors including adverse selection, moral hazard, and 
technological opportunities, but we assume that whatever the factors are C is unable to use complex contracts to 
overcome the information problem.    8
 
Hypothesis 2: The effect in Hypothesis 1 is stronger if more of R’s previous alliances involve 
the same technology as the current alliance. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The effect in Hypothesis 1 is stronger if more of R’s previous alliances are with 
the current client. 
 
  Second, consider factors that affect q, C’s prior belief about the project’s type. Two main 
factors that affect q are the tasks in the project and the technology used to carry out those tasks. 
Alliances that involve R&D or technology exchanges involve high uncertainty about success 
compared to alliances that involve manufacturing or marketing a product that already exists and 
works. R&D is inherently uncertain, and technology exchanges often involve exchanges of tacit 
know-how that is difficult to codify. Both have high risks of failure. This suggests the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: An equity link is more likely to be used when the project tasks involve uncertain 
outcomes, as is the case for R&D projects and technology exchanges. 
 
The technologies used in biotechnology vary (see Appendix A), and it is reasonable to expect 
that some yield more predictable outcomes. This suggests that we should control for technology 
type, and we do so in the empirical analysis below. 
  Third, consider factors that affect I, C’s investment in the project. Part of I is a transfer of 
funds. This suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5: An equity link is more likely to be used when C’s estimated money investment in 
the project is larger. 
 
More generally, I includes non-monetary transfers of knowledge and other resources. Thus, it is 
reasonable to believe that I is higher in agreements that involve more collaboration, as is the case 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
8 Of course, in real-world alliances monitoring can occur without an equity link, and equity links create closer ties to 
improve monitoring. For expositional purposes it is convenient to make the comparison stark by assuming that 
monitoring is impossible without an equity link.        9
in co-development and co-marketing alliances, because more collaboration implies that C 
allocates more of its resources to the alliance.
9 This suggests the following testable hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 6: An equity link is more likely to be used when the project involves more 
collaboration. 
 
  Fourth, consider factors that affect e, the amount of the equity purchase. The main 
determinant of e is R’s firm value. R’s value determines how expensive it is to acquire a large 
enough share of its equity in order to form ties close enough to facilitate monitoring. This 
suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 7: An equity link is more likely to be used when R’s value is low. 
  
  Finally, consider factors that affect t, the transaction cost associated with the equity 
purchase. The transaction cost is likely to be low if R’s equity is easier to trade. This suggests 
that an equity link is more likely to be observed when R is a public company. Interestingly, this 
effect may lead to a tendency that is the opposite of Hypothesis 7 because small companies are 
less likely to be publicly traded. 
 
Hypothesis 8: An equity link is more likely to be used if R is publicly traded. 
 
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis in the next section we will briefly consider 
the impact of extending the model to allow for more dynamics. In the simple model presented 
here C either buys equity in R at the beginning of the alliance or never does, and the equity link 
generates perfect signals of R’s ability and the project’s quality. Suppose instead that p and q 
evolve over the life of the project, and that an equity link improves the quality of the imperfect 
signals of p and q. Further, suppose that I can change as milestones are reached. In this case it 
may be optimal for C to acquire equity in R after the initial signing date of the alliance.
10 Bad 
                                                        
9 Co-development alliances involve sharing costs, technology, risks, or benefits when jointly developing products. 
Co-marketing alliances involve jointly marketing a product. 
10 For a formal development of how a resource allocator’s beliefs about a researcher and a project evolve in response 
to observations of project success and failure in a dynamic environment see Filson (2000).   10 
signals lower p and q, and this makes it more likely that inequality (3) holds. Good signals can 
also lead to equity links because I might increase as milestones are reached and new stages are 
entered. This suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 9: An equity link is more likely to be used if the terms of the alliance are modified 
after the initial contract is signed. 
 
More generally, if p, q, and I vary over the stages of the project, as they do in biotechnology 
projects, the stage of the project at which the alliance is formed affects the use of equity links. 
This suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 10: An equity link is more likely to be used when the alliance is formed during a 
stage that involves high investments from C, a high risk of failure, or both. 
  




As in the model presented in Section 2, we take the decision to enter into an alliance as given and 
focus on whether the allies use an equity link or not. The unit of observation is an alliance. 
Recombinant Capital Corporation (ReCap, www.recap.com) provides online summaries of 
biotechnology alliances formed since the mid 1970s when the industry began.
11 Each summary 
indicates the client partner, the R&D partner, the date the alliance is formed, the most recent date 
of modification (if the terms have been modified), the type of alliance (biotech/biotech or 
drug/biotech), and summarizes the tasks to be performed and the contract terms. Many 
summaries also provide the intended application, the technology the allies will use, and the stage 
the project is at when the alliance is formed. The possible tasks, contract terms, applications, 
technologies, and stages are summarized in Appendix A. In our analysis, we assume that the 
tasks, applications, technologies, and stages are exogenous and the contract terms are 
                                                        
11 For summaries of the evolution of the biotechnology industry, see Pisano et al. (1988) and Henderson et al. 
(1999).   11 
endogenous. This is a reasonable assumption: partners take the project as given and design an 
appropriate contract to accomplish the project’s goals. 
  Prior to June 2001 there are 7162 alliances. We remove 614 observations on mergers and 
acquisitions from this sample (ReCap uses a broad definition of “alliance”) and use the 
remaining alliances to compute the R&D firm’s number of previous biotechnology alliances.
12 
After doing so we restrict the sample to facilitate hypothesis testing. We exclude 227 joint 
ventures and 295 alliances with multiple partners. Including alliances with multiple partners 
would complicate the test of Hypothesis 3 because it is not clear how to measure the R&D firm’s 
previous alliances with its current client in these cases. Further, in order to test Hypothesis 2 we 
restrict our attention to those alliances for which a description of the technology is provided – 
this leaves 4344 observations. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for our variables. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that takes the value one if the alliance involves a minority equity link. We 
obtained similar results using a dependent variable that includes joint ventures (the dependent 
variable Pisano, 1989, uses), but as the model in Section 2 focuses on minority equity links we 
maintain that focus here. We also tried including options and warrants in the dependent variable, 
and none of the conclusions of the hypothesis tests changed.
13 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, are tested using the R&D firm’s number of previous alliances 
with technologies and partners different from the current ones, the number of previous alliances 
with a different partner but the same technology as the current alliance, and the number of 
previous alliances with the current partner. To test an alternative explanation of our results we 
will consider the effects of previous alliances that have equity links; these variables are also 
included in Table 1. 
Hypothesis 4 is tested using dummy variables for the tasks associated with the alliance: 
research, development, technology, supply, manufacturing, and marketing.
14 Hypothesis 5 is 
tested using size, the estimated dollar amount transferred from the client to the R&D firm (the 
                                                        
12 We attempt to eliminate terminated alliances from the count of previous alliances using press releases provided on 
ReCap’s website. 
13 Options and warrants may be options to purchase equity in the future, but may involve other options such as the 
options to license a product or terminate an agreement. The data does not allow us to distinguish between these 
different types of options. 
14 Technology and supply alliances tend to lie in between R&D and manufacturing and marketing in the vertical 
chain, but their position in the chain can vary. For example, in supply alliances one of the partners provides a   12 
client’s current investment plus its estimated future investment given the contract terms, 
discounted according to standard rules that take into account the timing and likelihood of future 
payments). This information is provided by ReCap when available. We deflate the dollar amount 
ReCap reports using the Consumer Price Index. Hypothesis 6 is tested using dummy variables 
that indicate when an alliance involves co-development, co-marketing, or general 
collaboration.
15 
Hypothesis 7 is tested using the R&D firm’s market capitalization (the number of shares 
outstanding multiplied by the price per share) in the month prior to the month the alliance is 
formed, deflated using the CPI.
16 Market capitalization is provided by the Center for Research in 
Security Prices of the University of Chicago (CRSP) and is available only for firms that are 
publicly traded on the American Stock Exchange, the Nasdaq Stock Market, and the New York 
Stock Exchange. When we test Hypotheses 7 and 8 we use a dummy variable that takes the value 
1 for R&D firms that are not publicly traded and exclude public firms that are not included in the 
CRSP database from the analysis. These include foreign public firms, firms traded over the 
counter, and firms that went public recently. The initial public offering dates of all of these firms 
were determined using information provided by Yahoo! Finance (http://finance.yahoo.com). In a 
few cases, some of the monthly market capitalization measures were missing from CRSP, and 
we exclude these observations as well.  
Hypothesis 9 is tested using a dummy variable that takes the value one if the alliance 
contract is modified after the initial signing date. Hypothesis 10 is tested using dummy variables 
for the stage of signing. The definitions of the various stages are provided in Appendix A, and 
information on the length and success rates of the phases of human clinical trials is summarized 
in Table 2. 
  We also include several control variables. We include a dummy variable for 
biotech/biotech alliances to allow for the possibility that these alliances differ from drug/biotech 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
technology or drug to the other partner, but this can be for development or marketing. We do not include a dummy 
variable for swaps because in the sample of 4344 alliances there are only two swaps. 
15 Our “marketing” category combines ReCap’s categories of commercialization, distribution, and marketing, and 
our “co-marketing” category combines ReCap’s categories of co-marketing and co-promotion. See Appendix A for 
a description of ReCap’s categories. 
16 We use the R&D firm’s market cap. in the month prior to the month the alliance is formed to avoid measurement 
problems associated with announcement effects. Chan et al. (1997) provide evidence that firms’ stock returns are 
typically positively affected by announcements of strategic alliances. Thus, the R&D firm’s market cap. in the 
month the alliance is formed is likely higher than the market cap. at the time the terms of the alliance are negotiated.   13 
alliances in their use of equity links.
17 As noted in Section 2, the model suggests that the 
technology the partners use affects whether they use an equity link. We use dummy variables for 
every technology that accounts for at least one per cent of the sample of 4344.
18 Further, we 
include year dummies for every year after 1984 to allow for the possibility that the model’s 
parameters p, q, I, e, and t vary over the sample period because of changes in financial sector 





We use probit models for all of our analysis; the results are essentially the same with logit 
models. Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors, and Table 4 reports the 
marginal effects of the variables of interest.
19 We estimate three equations; the tradeoff is 
between sample size and the number of hypotheses we can test. Equation 1 uses the largest 
sample but tests the fewest number of hypotheses, and Equation 3 tests all of the hypotheses but 
uses a relatively small sample. 
Equation 1 tests Hypotheses 1-4, 6, and 9, and the results support the hypotheses. All of 
the variables have the predicted sign and most are statistically significant. As predicted by 
Hypotheses 1-3, the likelihood of observing an equity link is decreasing in the R&D firm’s 
number of previous alliances, and this effect is stronger if more of these alliances use the same 
technology as the current one and if more are with the current client. Gulati (1995a) also finds a 
negative effect of previous alliances with the current client using data from the automotive, 
biotechnology, and new materials industries. In contrast, using a small sample that excludes 
alliances that involve R&D, Oxley (1997) finds no effect of previous alliances with the current 
                                                        
17 In our preliminary work we also considered the possibility that previous drug/biotech alliances have different 
effects from previous biotech/biotech alliances but found no significant difference. 
18 We also tried including dummy variables for the 19 applications that account for at least one percent of the 
observations, but the hypothesis that all of these coefficients were zero could not be rejected at the 10% level of 
significance, and none of the conclusions of the hypothesis tests changed, so we leave them out in the results 
reported here. 
19 The marginal effect of a variable measures the estimated change in the probability of observing an equity link 
given a small change in the value of the variable. The sign of the marginal effect can be inferred from the sign of the 
estimated coefficient, but its magnitude must be computed separately because the probit model is nonlinear (see 
Greene, 2000, for a discussion).   14 
client or of “alliance experience,” the average number of previous alliances that the client and the 
R&D firm have. 
As predicted by Hypothesis 4, alliances that involve R&D or technology exchanges are 
more likely to have equity links than those that involve marketing. Several previous authors have 
also found a positive effect of R&D on the use of equity links in biotechnology and other 
alliances (Pisano, 1989; Gulati, 1995a; and Gulati and Singh, 1998). As predicted by Hypothesis 
6, alliances that involve a greater degree of collaboration, as measured by the co-development, 
co-marketing, and collaboration dummy variables, are more likely to have equity links. Finally, 
as predicted by Hypothesis 9, equity links are more likely to be observed if the contract has been 
modified after the initial signing date. 
Equation 2 uses the 2694 observations for which the stage of signing is observed to test 
Hypothesis 10. The conclusions for the other hypothesis tests are unchanged, and the estimated 
effects of the stage dummies support Hypothesis 10. Equity links are more likely to be used 
during the pre-clinical stage and phases 2 and 3 of human clinical trials, and evidence provided 
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (1999) suggests that these stages involve higher risks 
of failure and higher investments than the other stages. Only 1 in 1000 compounds tested in the 
pre-clinical stage reach human clinical trials, and the pre-clinical stage lasts from 1 to 6 years. As 
shown in Table 2, phase 2 involves a high risk of failure and a relatively large investment of time 
and resources compared to phase 1. Phase 3 is less risky but involves a much larger investment 
of time and resources. DiMasi et al. (1991) estimate that phase 2’s average cost is approximately 
twice that of phase 1, and phase 3’s average cost is approximately three times that of phase 2. In 
contrast, once a Product License Application or a New Drug Application is filed there is a 
relatively high chance of success and a relatively short waiting period, and if the product has 
been approved when the alliance is formed the risk of failure drops considerably. The estimates 
suggest that equity links are much less likely in these cases, and this is consistent with 
Hypothesis 10. 
Equation 3 restricts the sample further by considering only the 1031 observations for 
which Size, the estimated dollar amount transferred from the client to the R&D firm, is 
measured, and for which either the R&D firm is private or a measure of its market capitalization 
is available. As in Equations 1 and 2, the results tend to support the model’s hypotheses, but all 
of the task and collaboration effects are statistically insignificant. This result may be due to the   15 
smaller sample or it may be the case that the project’s stage and the client’s money investment 
provide better measures of the risk of failure and the client’s total investment than the task and 
collaboration effects. As predicted by Hypothesis 5, size has a positive effect on the likelihood 
that an equity link is used. As predicted by Hypothesis 7, the R&D firm’s market capitalization 
has a negative effect. The effect of the R&D firm being a private firm is positive and statistically 
insignificant. This suggests that the firm size effect of Hypothesis 7 dominates the transaction 
cost effect of Hypothesis 8: the dummy variable is effectively a proxy for small firm size. 
Hypothesis 7 suggests that alliances with private firms are more likely to involve equity links 
because private firms are typically smaller than public firms. As noted in Section 2, Hypothesis 8 
suggests the opposite effect should occur because the equity of private firms is more difficult to 
trade. 
The control variables also have explanatory power in Equations 1-3. In Equations 1 and 2 
the biotech/biotech dummy is negative and significant. Its positive sign and lack of significance 
in Equation 3 suggests that its effect in Equations 1 and 2 can be attributed to unmeasured size 
and market capitalization effects. Several of the technology dummy variables are statistically 
significant. This is consistent with our view that the technology the partners use affects their 
likelihood of success, which in turn affects their use of an equity link. The year effects are almost 
all positive and most are statistically significant. This suggests that financial sector, industry, and 
macroeconomic changes since the early 1980s have made the use of equity links more desirable. 
  Table 4 presents the estimated marginal effects and shows that the independent variables 
have substantial effects on the likelihood that firms use an equity link. To interpret the effects of 
previous alliances, size, and market capitalization, consider increasing each variable by 
approximately one standard deviation (standard deviations are summarized in Table 1). The 
point estimates from Equations 1-3 suggest that increasing the number of previous alliances with 
a different technology and client from the current ones by nine decreases the likelihood of 
observing an equity link by as much as 5.3 percentage points. Increasing the number of previous 
alliances with the same technology as the current one but a different client by five decreases the 
likelihood of observing an equity link by as much as 8 percentage points. Each additional 
previous alliance with the current client decreases the likelihood of observing an equity link by 
as much as 7.7 percentage points. The estimates from Equation 3 suggest that increasing Size by 
$46 million increases the likelihood of observing an equity link by 29 percentage points.   16 
Increasing the R&D firm’s market capitalization by $2.13 billion decreases the likelihood of 
observing an equity link by 40.5 percentage points. 
  The marginal effects of the dummy variables can be read directly from Table 4. For 
example, Equation 1 suggests that if the alliance involves research the likelihood of observing an 
equity link rises by 2.5 percentage points. Large positive percentage point increases occur if the 
alliance involves development (6.8), technology exchanges (12), or co-development (11), and if 
the contract has been modified (15). The results from Equation 2 suggest that the stage of signing 
has important effects: pre-clinical (11), phase 2 (10), and phase 3 (15). 
Before concluding, it is worth mentioning that we considered an alternative explanation 
for the negative effect of previous alliances. It seems possible that previous alliances have the 
effect we observe in Table 3 because previous allies have purchased sufficient equity in the R&D 
firm to effectively control it. As a result, current equity purchases have such a small impact that 
they are not worthwhile. A partner with a given stake in the R&D firm might expect to be less 
influential on its board and in the lab if several other partners have large stakes. We tested this 
alternative explanation using the number of previous alliances of each type that have equity 
links. In contrast to what the alternative explanation suggests, the effect of previous alliances 
with equity links is less negative than the effect of those without. None of the conclusions of the 
hypothesis tests changed. Our theory does not make a clear prediction about the effects of 
previous alliances with equity links. According to our theory, previous equity links are a sign 
that previous allies found monitoring to be worthwhile. This could mean that the R&D firm’s 
activities involve high uncertainty, and as a result the current client also finds monitoring 
worthwhile. 
   
4. Conclusion 
 
  This paper develops a simple model of monitoring and staged investment to explain why 
client firms in strategic alliances often purchase some of their R&D partner’s equity. In the 
model an equity link facilitates monitoring, and this allows the client to resolve its uncertainty 
about the R&D firm and the project before committing more resources to the project. The model 
generates several testable hypotheses about the determinants of equity links in strategic alliances,   17 
and we test these hypotheses using a large sample of biotechnology alliances and find empirical 
support. 
  Future work could explore the determinants of contractual devices other than equity 
links. Future work could also develop the links between an R&D firm’s previous alliances and its 
current ones and explore such matters as the timing of alliance formation, the selection of 
partners, and the growth of industry networks. Some work along this line has been done by 
Gulati (1995b) and Walker et al. (1997).   18 
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Appendix A: Alliance Tasks, Terms, Applications, Technologies, and Stages 
ReCap describes the type of each alliance using one or more of the following labels, which 
describe tasks and contract terms: 
 
Tasks: Co-Development, Co-Marketing, Co-Promotion, Collaboration, Commercialization, 
Development, Distribution, Manufacturing, Marketing, Research, Supply, Swap, and 
Technology. 
Terms: Acquisition, Asset Purchase, Assignment, Credit, Cross-License, Equity, Joint Venture, 
License, Loan, Letter of Intent, Merger, Option, Security, Settlement, Sublicense, Termination, 
and Warrant. 
 
We construct categories for application using the primary application ReCap mentions: 
Agriculture, Alcoholism, Antifungals, Anti-inflammatory, Autoimmune, Blood & Hematopoietic 
Factors, Cancer, Cardiovascular, Central Nervous System, Cosmetics, Cystic Fibrosis, 
Cytomegalovirus, Dental/Oral, Dermatologic, Diagnostics, Gastro-Intestinal, 
Gynecological/Genito-Urinary, Hair Growth, IBD, Industrial Chemicals, Infection, Kidney 
Disease, Liver Disease, Livestock Diseases, Metabolic Disorders, Nutritionals/Vitamins, 
Obesity, Ophthalmics, Orthopedics, OTC Products, Pain, Respiratory Disorders, Screening, 
Smoking Cessation, Transplantation, and Wound Care. 
 
We construct technology categories using the primary technology ReCap mentions: Adjuvant, 
Attenuated Virus Production, Bioinformatics, Carbohydrates, Cell Therapy – Stem Cells/Factors, 
Collagen Matrix, Combinatorial, Device, DNA Probes, Drug Delivery, Gene Expression, Gene 
Sequencing, Generics, Hyaluronic Acid, Immunoassay, Immunoglobulin, Implantable Devices, 
In-licensed Products, Ion Channel Technologies, Microarrays, Micropropagation, Microspheres, 
Monoclonals, Natural Product, Oligonucleotides, Peptides, PFOB Emulsions, 
Pharmacogenomics, Phototherapy, Polyclonal Antibodies, Polyethylene Glycol Products, 
Proteomics, Purines & Pyrimidines, Rational Drug Design, Recombinant DNA, Resin Polymers, 
Screening, Separations, Service Laboratory, Synthetics, Transcription Factors, and Transgenics. 
 
   21 
The stage of signing is one of the following:  
Discovery: No lead product candidate has been identified 
Lead molecule: A lead product candidate has been identified, but no animal testing has occurred 
Pre-clinical: Some animal data has been obtained but human trials have not begun 
Formulation: The combination of drugs with an agent for the administration of the drugs 
Phase 1: Safety in humans 
Phase 2: Small-scale efficacy in humans 
Phase 3: Large-scale efficacy in humans 
PLA/NDA filed: Testing of the lead product is complete and under regulatory review 
Approved: The lead product has been approved for marketing   22 
Table 1. Summary Statistics (4344 observations except where noted) 
Variable Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
       
The alliance involves a minority equity link  .16 .37  0  1 
       
The R&D firm’s number of previous alliances that do not involve the same technology as 
the current alliance and are not with the current client 
4.75 9.08  0  101 
The R&D firm’s number of previous alliances that involve the same technology as the 
current alliance and are not with the current client 
2.83 4.78  0  38 
The R&D firm’s number of previous alliances with the current client  .12 .45  0  5 
     The number of previous alliances not with the current client that have equity links  .96 1.40  0  12 
     The number of previous alliances with the current client that have equity links  .029 .18  0  3 
       
The alliance involves research  .25 .43  0  1 
The alliance involves development  .33 .47  0  1 
The alliance involves a technology exchange  .0037 .061  0  1 
The alliance involves supply  .12 .32  0  1 
The alliance involves manufacturing  .041 .20  0  1 
The alliance involves marketing  .13 .34  0  1 
       
Size: the estimated dollar amount transferred from C to R, measured in hundreds of 
millions of 1983 dollars (1436 observations) 
.18 .46  0  12.88 
The alliance involves co-development  .028 .17  0  1 
The alliance involves co-marketing  .049 .22  0  1 
The alliance involves collaboration  .18 .38  0  1 
       
The R&D firm’s market capitalization (the number of shares outstanding multiplied by 
the price per share), measured in billions of 1983 dollars (1699 observations)  
.42 2.13  .00080  47.88 
The R&D firm is not publicly traded  .61 .49  0  1 
The alliance terms have been modified after the initial date  .21 .41  0  1 
       
Stage of signing (2749 observations):       
       
Discovery  .42 .49  0  1 
Lead Molecule  .084 .28  0  1 
Pre-clinical  .069 .25  0  1 
Formulation  .18 .38  0  1 
Phase 1 Clinical Trials  .033 .18  0  1 
Phase 2 Clinical Trials  .052 .22  0  1 
Phase 3 Clinical Trials  .038 .19  0  1 
Product License Application/New Drug Application Filed  .020 .14  0  1 
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Table 1, Cont. Summary Statistics for the Control Variables (4580 observations) 
Variable Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
        
The alliance is a biotech/biotech alliance  .34 .47  0  1 
        
Technology Dummies:         
        
Adjuvant  .012 .11  0  1 
Bioinformatics  .012 .11  0  1 
Cell Therapy  .014 .12  0  1 
Combinatorial  .027 .16  0  1 
Device  .059 .24  0  1 
DNA Probes  .024 .15  0  1 
Drug Delivery  .13 .34  0  1 
Gene Expression  .078 .27  0  1 
Gene Sequencing  .033 .18  0  1 
Immunoassay  .070 .26  0  1 
In-licensed Products  .046 .21  0  1 
Monoclonals  .078 .27  0  1 
Natural Product  .011 .10  0  1 
Oligonucleotides  .039 .19  0  1 
Peptides  .015 .12  0  1 
Rational Drug Design  .015 .12  0  1 
Recombinant DNA  .069 .25  0  1 
Screening  .085 .28  0  1 
Synthetics  .067 .25  0  1 
Transcription Factors  .013 .11  0  1 
Transgenics  .014 .12  0  1 
        
Year Dummies:         
        
Pre-1985  .021 .14  0  1 
1985  .0076 .087  0  1 
1986  .0094 .097  0  1 
1987  .015 .12  0  1 
1988  .015 .12  0  1 
1989  .020 .14  0  1 
1990  .029 .17  0  1 
1991  .035 .18  0  1 
1992  .049 .22  0  1 
1993  .053 .22  0  1 
1994  .067 .25  0  1 
1995  .091 .29  0  1 
1996  .12 .32  0  1 
1997  .13 .34  0  1 
1998  .12 .33  0  1 
1999  .10 .31  0  1 
2000  .10 .30  0  1 
2001  .015 .12  0  1 
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Table 2. The Phases of Human Clinical Trials for New Drugs 
  Number of Patients  Length  Purpose  Percent of Drugs 
Successfully Tested* 
Phase 1  20-100  Several months  Mainly safety  70 
Phase 2  Up to several hundred  Several months to 2 
years 
Some short-term 
safety, but mainly 
effectiveness 
33 
Phase 3  Several hundred to 
several thousand 




Source: U.S. Food and Drug Administration (1999) 
 
•  Of 100 drugs for which investigational new drug applications are submitted to the Food and Drug Administration, 
about 70 complete phase 1 and go to phase 2; 33 of the original 100 complete phase 2 and go to phase 3; and 25-30 
of the original 100 clear phase 3 (and about 20 of the original 100 will ultimately be approved for marketing)    25 
Table 3. Probit Model: Determinants of Minority Equity Links. 
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Size and Market Cap:     
Size    1.70*** 
(.23) 
R&D Firm’s Market 
Capitalization 
  -.50** 
(.23) 
R&D Firm is Not Publicly 
Traded 
  .16 
(.11) 
     
Log Likelihood  -1669.84 -1143.78 -555.01 
Restricted Log Likelihood  -1941.06 -1371.59 -688.08 
* Significant at the 10% level       ** Significant at the 5% level       *** Significant at the 1% level 
The estimated effects of the control variables are reported on the next two pages   26 
Table 3, cont. Probit Model: Determinants of Minority Equity Links. Control Variables. 







     






     






Bioinformatics  -.73** 
(.36) 
  










































Immunoassay  -.35** 
(.14) 
  


































































* Significant at the 10% level       ** Significant at the 5% level       *** Significant at the 1% level   27 
Table 3, cont. Probit Model: Determinants of Minority Equity Links. Year Effects. 







     






































































































* Significant at the 10% level       ** Significant at the 5% level       *** Significant at the 1% level   28 
Table 4. Marginal Effects of the Variables of Interest, Computed at the Mean Values 
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Size and Market Cap:     
Size    .63*** 
(.083) 
R&D Firm’s Market 
Capitalization 
  -.19** 
(.083) 
R&D Firm is Not Publicly 
Traded 
  .057 
(.041) 
* Significant at the 10% level       ** Significant at the 5% level       *** Significant at the 1% level F
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